The panpsychist approach to the problem of consciousness has gained momentum in the last few decades in the philosophy of mind. Panpsychism holds that mentality or consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the universe. It offers a non-physicalist reduction of human consciousness. By doing so, it attempts to escape the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness that has been troubling physicalist theories for years. The most widely accepted form of panpsychism is the constitutive version. However, it is challenged on the basis of the combination problem. To avoid the combination problem, some recent panpsychist philosophers have argued for a new version of panpsychist theory: emergent panpsychism. This version attempts to solve the combination problem by using the notion of emergence. This paper aims to examine the coherence and plausibility of emergent panpsychism as an alternative to constitutive panpsychism. I shall argue that the emergent version of panpsychism in its present form, though a coherent view, does not seem to be a better alternative than the constitutive version.

Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” (1971) is one of the most influential papers written on the ethics of abortion. The paper is particularly famous for the thought experiment of the ailing violinist, which has come to be known as “Thomson’s Violinist”. Thomson’s attempt in the paper is largely defensive: through various examples, she argues that abortion is not impermissible, rather than that it is permissible. The only explicitly positive claim that she makes is that in cases where abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother, it is permissible as an act of self-defence. Thomson’s nuanced and novel stance in the paper has incited numerous responses, both against and in support of it. I look at three different objections raised against the paper by Brody (1972), Davis (1983) and Hershenov (2001). Upon a critical examination of these objections, I argue that they are not sound and fail to undermine Thomson’s views.