Ph.D. Scholars
Anand S.S.
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: 21hpph02@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Disagreements, Theories of Knowledge, Philosophy of Language.
Supervisor: Dr. B. Ananda Sagar
Research Area/Title: Epistemology of Disagreement
Deskyong Angmo
M.A. Philosophy, BHU
Email: 21hpph04@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Death, Ethics
Supervisor: Dr. Kavita Chauhan
Research Area/Title: Death (Bardo) from Tibetan Buddhism’s Perspective
Kunduru Venkateswara Reddy
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: 21hpph01@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
Supervisor: Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka
Research Area/Title: Metasemantics
Medi Chaitanya
M.Phil., UoH
Email: 21hpph05@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Indian Epistemology
Supervisor: Prof. C. A. Tomy
Research Area/Title: The Problem of Existence
Amit Kumar Chourasia
M.Phil, UoH
Email: 20hpph02@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Continental Philosophy, Social and Political Philosohy, Existentilaism
Supervisor: Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka
Research Area/Title: Reframing feminism from the perspectives of Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault
Ashitha M.S.
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: 20hpph03@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Science and Values, Philsophy of Science
Supervisor: Dr. Shinod N. K.
Research Area/Title: Philosophy of psychiatry
Hari Sankar M.
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: 20hpph06@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Epistemology, Skepticism
Supervisor: Dr. B. Ananda Sagar
Research Area/Title: Understanding Epistemic Closure and its significance in Skepticism
Praveena P.
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: 20hpph04@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Philosophy of science, Causation, Evidence
Supervisor: Dr. Shinod N. K.
Research Area/Title: Evidence and Causality in Regulatory Sciences.
Raushan Kumar
M.A. Philosophy, BHU
Email: 20hpph05@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Consciousness, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics
Supervisor: Prof. C. A. Tomy
Research Area/Title: Consciousness in Contemporary Analytical Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness is arguably one of the most puzzling and mysterious phenomena in the universe. Different theories attempt to define and explain consciousness differently. Two central metaphysical theories of consciousness in the present times are the dualist and the physicalist theories. Both of these theories have fatal flaws. Dualist theories cannot answer the questions of mental causation, whereas physicalist theories are silent on the questions regarding the explanatory gap and the conceivability argument. Panpsychist theorists claim to solve both of these problems. The primary objective of the proposed research is to critically analyze Panpsychism as an alternative theory to both Physicalism and Dualism. Since the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness is the hardest nut to crack in the physicalist theory of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), the proposed research lays primary emphasis on evaluating the merits of the panpsychist theories in solving the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness.
Chenithung L. Ngullie
M.A. Philosophy, University of Madras
Email: 19hpph03@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Political Philosophy
Supervisor: Prof. C. A. Tomy
Research Area/Title: The Concept of Toleration
The concept of toleration has been a significant subject of discourse in politics and philosophy over the last few centuries in our effort to understand and build a more accepting and accommodating society. Any modern democratic state is an embodiment of the contractarian system of government. And with the explosion of globalisation, the world has never been this diverse. Multiculturalism is the story of any modern society, and every political system is embedded into it. The need for toleration thus, becomes relevant in such settings, be it between individuals, groups or factions, or between the State and the individual or public, which is the focus of this research. Taking the contractarian framework, the research aims to present yet another approach towards the philosophy of toleration, in the context of the State vs the Citizen(s).
Deborah Chingbiakhoih Singsit
M.A. Philosophy, JNU
Email: 19hpph05@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Personal Identity, Philosophy of Mind, Existentialism
Supervisor: Prof. C. A. Tomy
Research Area/Title: The Problem of Personal Identity with reference to Disassociate identity Disorder
The proposed work is an attempt to understand how Dissociate Identity Disorder (DID) emerges in an Individual. The aim is to understand the causes of its emergence, and how an individual who has more than one personality /self can be considered the same over a period of time, this issue is dealt with using the help of the notion of Narrative Identity. I propose that the many selves that develop in a person with DID are the individual's attempt to protect his future self, which I aim to understand in light of Sartre's notion of Bad faith and the Other, and Parfit’s notion of Future selves.
The proposed work would help us better conceive how the human mind deliberates various ways to self-preserve; and how narration acts as a tool to preserve and reintegrate the various selves. It would give an insight into how complex the self is and break the traditional way of understanding personal identity and why the self cannot be understood in isolation but only in relation to the world, it interacts with. Finally, attempting to show that there could be unity of consciousness in individuals with many selves.
Justrus Mathew
M.Phil, UoH
Email: mathewjustrus970@gmail.com
Research Interests: Philosophy of science, Epsitemic disagreement, non-evidential epistemology
Supervisor: Prof. C. A. Tomy
Research Area/Title: Epistemology: An Enquiry into the Concept of Evidence
The objective of the study is to show that evidence is inevitable concept in any form of discussion regarding justification. The enquiry specifically tries to defend the evidential status of ‘intuition’, which is not usually given an evidential status.
Most of the theories which uses evidence for justification expects a necessary relationship between the evidence and the belief. But there are limitations which are in principle accompanied with the ‘evidence’; the support or confidence ‘evidence’ can provide for a proposition, especially regarding the truth of a proposition or belief. Given the imitations that are in principle that are there for ‘evidence’, the study tries to evaluate the tenets of ‘Evidentialism’ (The epistemic justification of anyone’s doxastic attitude toward any proposition at any time strongly supervenes on the evidence that the person has).
Non - evidentialist theories of justification are theories which says there are propositions which are justified without evidence, one of the such theory is ‘Hinge epistemology’. The final part of the study is to analyse the nature of evidence which the hinge epistemologist holds and to show that their concept of evidence is inadequate. Hinge statements are in general defined as the propositions which cannot be given an evidential support but its justification is presupposed. A more adequate account of evidence would provide an alternate justificatory account in terms of evidence for the hinge propositions.
Mohammed Suhail E. M.
M.A. Philosophy, IGNOU
Email: suhailems@gmail.com
Research Interests: Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
Supervisor: Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka
Research Area/Title: Epistemic Warrant
My research aims to study the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga, especially his notion of
warrant. It will give special focus, among others, on his warrant trilogy; Warrant the Current
Debate, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief. The research is an
attempt to analyse his concept of warrant which bypasses Justification as a means to attain
knowledge. According to this view, Justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for
knowledge but what is required is warrant. According to this idea, a belief B has warrant for
S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments involved in the production of B) are
functioning properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which S’s
faculties are designed; and the modules of the design plan governing the production B are (1)
aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in
accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true; and the more
firmly S believes B the more warrant B has for S.
According to this position, beliefs about the past, about other persons, about external
objects, etc., have warrant not based on the propositional evidence as the foundationalist
claims. Instead, when we are appropriately appeared to, and other conditions for warrant are
met, then we have knowledge. He rejects other conditions of knowledge and suggests warrant
as a replacement. However, it has faced criticisms like opening door for relativism and not
taking sceptic challenges seriously, etc. Thus, the research will try to answer the following
questions:
a- Are justification and evidence dispensable in epistemology for the sake of warrant?
b- Does Plantinga’s approach to define warrant open the door for relativism?
c- Is Plantinga’s Warrant able to refute Skepticism?
The research will be done by looking into sources of Plantinga and how his epistemology was formed through decades; why and how he rejects the available strands of knowledge like coherentism, foundationalism, evidentialism and reliabilism and finally arrives at his own notion of warrant; and what are the major criticisms against his stand. Thereafter, an assessment of both Plantinga and his critics will be made. It will take into account Plantinga’s responses as well as responses to his responses. Not only that, an attempt will be made to check the validity of the criticisms raised against him but also an attempt will be to check the validity of Plantinga’s responses and responses to his responses.
Nabanita Barman
M.A. Philosophy, JNU
Email: 19hpph11@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Analytic philosophy
Supervisor: Prof. C. A. Tomy
Research Area/Title: Categorial Intuition and Intentionality:An Enquiry into Heidegger’s meaning of ‘being of the object of perception’
The work explores and examines Heidegger’s project on being with reference to his notion of categorial intuition. The primary issues which are to be dealt within the course of the work are as follows- what role does categorial intuition play in Heidegger’s phenomenology and how is intentionality related to categorial intuition? The second question addresses the importance of ‘being’ in regard to categorial intuition. The third problem examines if categories can only be ascribed to physical entities. The final question is an attempt at understanding if Heidegger’s notion of categorial intuition be identified with externalism.
Parthiban A. V.
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: abhiramacheri@gmail.com
Research Interests: Epistemology, Philosophy of Logic, Ethics
Supervisor: Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka
Research Area/Title: The Gettier Problem : A Critical Inquiry of the First Postulate.
"In Epistemology, justification has traditionally (before the Gettier problem) been woven with the very definition of knowledge. However, there are seemingly insurmountable challenges to the position of Justification in epistemology. The Gettier problem is both central to this challenge as well as considered central to the field of epistemology itself by many. The Objective of this research would be to critically examine the first postulate of Gettier’s article,“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” The first postulate states,”…it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.” Another way of expressing this view would be that there are justified beliefs which are false beliefs. Thus implying that there are justified false beliefs. It is obvious that he uses this view and the other view (which has be called the ‘Closure view’ (Justification is closed for propositions or Justification satisfies the closure rule)) to prove his theory and as a basis for his proof, hence the term- Postulate. The first postulate is the key assumption in Gettier’s analysis of knowledge and his counter examples. It clearly characterizes justification in a certain manner.My approach will be to critically analyze the postulate and its significance as well as the consequence of this statement in various contexts and check its validity."
Renadev M. V.
M.Phil., SSUS, Kalady
Email: 19hpph07@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Continental Philosophy, Aesthetics, Existentialism, Metaphysics
Supervisor: Dr. Kavita Chauhan
Research Area/Title: Neitzsche’s Conception of Subjectivity and Freedom with reference to Aesthetics
The research aims to analyze the nature of subjectivity and freedom from the Nietzschean aesthetic perspective. Subjectivity, according to Nietzsche, instead of a singular, is a whole entity. The subject is seen as a subjective multiplicity. Here the primary things are actions, instincts, passions, feelings, and becoming above subjects, substances, or beings. The subject is not a singular self but an existence that involves the person's body, thoughts, relations with others, and environmental conditions. Nietzsche challenges traditional metaphysics through this perspective, particularly Descartes's view of immaterial and independent substance. So Nietzsche claims that the subject is a multiplicity, not pre-existed, unchanging, eternal substance. We can assume that freedom is the by-product of self-creation from these perspectives. Here, the concept of freedom is related to subjectivity; Nietzsche proposes that, in reality, a Will can never be completely free or unfree; instead, any specific Will becomes strong or weak to some substantial degree. To be a strong Will means one can exercise their freedom. Freedom is the willingness to be responsible for ourselves. Simply it means it is a consideration of your genuineness by yourself. It is awareness about yourself, your taste, and accepting your individuality. Therefore the creation of subjectivity itself leads to the creation of freedom. So from the aesthetical perspective, individuals can participate in the formation of subjectivity and freedom; one is not a passive spectator of their subject creation but an active participator.
Saumya Ranjan Mallick
M.Phil., UoH
Email: 19hpph10@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Phenomenology, Philosophy of Mind
Supervisor: Chandra B. Varma
Research Area/Title: As Consciousness depicted in Nagarjuna’s Philosophy and Husserl’s Intentionality
In my research work I would like to understand what is Consciousness in Nagarjuna’s point of view and in Husserl’s point of view. According to Nagarjuna, by realizing ultimate reality, and by being one with it, he continues to claim that one can view reality from any standpoint because to know all aspects of one’s mind is also to know all other forms of Consciousness. In his point view, one may infer that if they correct their mind and achieve absolute knowledge of it, they would view life from reality’s standpoint which includes the point of views of all objects. Nagarjuna instructs that one’s awareness of ultimate reality can only come through diligent mental cultivation, which helps to erase ignorance or the root of all misery. As Husserl says, without Consciousness there would not be a world at all even the world depends on the availability of Consciousness, again phenomenology has to study the realm of pure consciousness. So that is the actual purpose of phenomenology to study the realm of pure consciousness, and the essential formations found there. Husserl advocates Phenomenological attitude, according to which reality is not separable from the subjective experience of it. He suspends or brackets the natural attitude and all the prejudices that are associated with the nature of the reality of the world. Here there can be question to be asked, like, Can we say that consciousness is reality and reality is consciousness?
Sreenish S.
M.Phil., University of Kerala
Email: 19hpph04@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Perception, Metaphysics, Social ontology, Ethics
Supervisor: Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka
Research Area/Title: Role of Intentionality in Searle’s Theory of Perception
The central question raised in philosophy of perception is that whether we perceive material objects directly/ immediately or not. There are different theories of perception that tries to give positive as well as negative response to this question. The Theory of Perception within the backdrop of Intentionality put forward by Searle tries to argue that we do perceive physical objects directly. This proposed thesis is an attempt to examine how far Searle succeed in developing a realistic theory of perception and to identify the significance of the concept of intentionality in developing a theory of perception.
Pooja Choudhury
M.Phil., UoH
Email: choudhurypooja@yahoo.in
Research Interests: Social ontology, Searle
Supervisor: Prof. Laxminarayan Lenka
Research Area/Title: Social Reality
Manoj Khakhlary
M.A. Philosophy, UoH
Email: khakhlary@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Buddhism, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology
Supervisor: Chandra B.. Varma
Research Area/Title: "Buddhist Concept of Karuna (Compassion) AND THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY"
In this present study, I will be focusing on the comprehensive analysis of “karuṇā” or “Compassion”, discussed in major schools of Buddhism primarily in Therāvāda and Mahāyāna schools. Further, I will be arguing in favor of Buddhism regarding the concept of “karuṇā” and its relevance to the present society or to the present World. Buddhism is one of the philosophical thoughts that has discussed the concept of “karuṇā” in its various traditions or sects. Early Buddhism that is Therāvāda Buddhism, as well as the later Buddhism or the Mahāyāna Buddhism have taken the concept very seriously and have treated the concept as one of their core Philosophical doctrines. However, the practice of karuṇā should not be limited to human beings only. We should extend it to all sentient beings. In other words, it is a desire to remove what is detrimental to others and their happiness including all sentient beings. The Buddha being one of the Greatest human personalities has possessed this quality and saw all the sentient beings with equal Karuṇā (compassion) irrespective of any differences. In Buddhism the concept Karuṇā as a virtue has an important value. Buddhism always encourages human beings to build an ethically perfect society and such endeavor will be possible only with the guidance of the ‘pole star like’ value called Karuṇā (compassion) which is a sublime mind state motivated by cherishing other living beings and wishes to release them from their suffering. The tides and turbulences that characterize the lives of contemporary man (human) leader one to ponder over the issue of re-evaluating the values so as to shape and reshape the contemporary framework of life. The revered flake of Buddha’s or Buddhism’s wisdom urges the peace-seeker to come out of the engulfing whirlpool and thereby revive the almost lost-value called Karuṇā upon which an all- accommodating value system can be constructed and that would cherish love and kindness. This work is an attempt to provide a better understanding of the concept in the light of Buddhism and to provide a potentially better Socio-Ethical practice that would represent a better way of life as well as would represent a better society.
Rashmi Nayak
M.A. Philosophy, Utkal University
Email: 17hpph02@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Aesthetics, Philosophy of art
Supervisor: Dr. Kavita Chauhan
Research Area/Title: Aesthetic Cognition with special reference to Abhinava Gupta
Sumit Rout
M.A. Philosophy, Pondicherry University
Email: 17hpph01@uohyd.ac.in
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science,
Supervisor: Dr. Venusa Tinyi
Research Area/Title: Scientific Realism
Selina Das
M.A. Philosophy, Utkal University
Email: selinadas37@gmail.com
Research Interests: Indian metaphysics, Contemporary indian philosophy, Ethics
Supervisor: Dr. Abhijeet Joshi
Research Area/Title: The Metaphysical Comparison of Adi Sankaracharya and Sri Aurobindo